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The music industry is currently subject to changes influenced by ongoing digitalisation and 
informatization that are unprecedented. Other sectors can expect to undergo in the near future                  
what the media industry is going through now – the movie industry being a prime suspect. 
Each day, some 600,000 copies of movies are exchanged via the Internet, most of these in 
violation of the copyright laws.1 The disruptive nature of technological development makes 
that the market for entertainment products and other content undergoes fundamental changes. 
Where ‘content’ used to be exchanged attached to a physical carrier, increasingly it has the 
features of an information product. 
This chapter will discuss only a few of the many changes that content industries 
undergo. These relate to the transition in the kind of product exchanged and the way in which 
it is exchanged. More specifically, I will discuss product differentiation and price 
discrimination as two important features of the relationship between retailer and consumer. 
Partly related to this is the industry dynamics one should expect, some of these are also 
discussed in this contribution. The market dynamics as well as the industry dynamics for 
information goods differs significantly from that of physical goods. Of course, the market for 
content will, certainly not in the foreseeable future, not be a perfect information market. 
Physical content products will continue to be sold. Still, the market for digital content will 
affects developments in the market for physical content. This will certainly be felt by firms in 
their ability to set prices, but may also be observed in the kind and number of newly released 
pieces of music. As such, the discussion here is relevant for content industries not affected by 
digitisation in the near future. 
                                                 
1 The Economist (2002) “Movies and the Internet: Napster all over again?” 23 maart, p.63; Wired (1999) "It's 
Playback Time!: And MP3 is only the Beginning," 7(9), August, pp.122ff. 
1. Content Industries 
Content may be defined, looking at the use of communication infrastructures such as Internet, 
as the information exchanged that is not necessary to maintain the infrastructure itself. 
Content includes entertainment people seek, but includes personal exchange of emails as well. 
I will focus mostly on the information exchanged by people via the Internet that is unrelated 
to their professional activities. To give an indication of the extent to which the Internet is used 
for purposes other than ‘functional’ ones, observe Table 1 showing the most sought keywords. 
 
Table 1: The Most Popular Search Words 
Gambling 
Sex 
Casino 
Porn 
Investing 
Hardcore 
Movie 
Nude 
xxx 
Game 
Source: www.keywordcity.com (September25, 2003) 
 
Content is in large part is the product of the deliberate efforts of individuals and organizations 
to be creative. Economists argue that the market offers insufficient benefits for individuals 
and organisations to be creative, giving rise to a need for Intellectual Property Rights such as 
copyrights (Landes & Posner 1989). Unlike patents that protect the idea for a new good or 
production process, copyrights protect the specific way in which an idea is expressed; it 
protects ‘original works of authorship’. Music, movies, books, computer code but also 
fragrances for perfume for instance may all be protected under copyright law. A 1998 OECD 
study discusses what it called ‘copyright industries’. These are industries that produce goods 
the exploitation of which can be limited under copyright law. Copyright law is an intellectual 
property right such as patent law and trademark law. It restricts the commercial exploitation 
of a newly developed good to the person or organisation that has developed it. The holder of 
the copyrights may chose not to exercise his rights; rights may also be traded in the market or 
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granted to a third party. There are some exceptions that limit the extent to which the holder of 
copyrights may exercise his rights. The work may be cited, and copies may be made by an 
individual for private, non-commercial purposes (referred to as ‘fair use’ or ‘fair dealing’). 
Copyright laws differ across countries. An important difference is between the Anglo-Saxon 
system and the Continental European one. In the latter, a so-called moral right is given to the 
original author in addition to the commercial rights. A moral right is an inalienable right that 
prevents people that may have otherwise legally procured a good from altering it. Obviously, 
there is more content than produced by these copyrights industries. As copyrights do not need 
to registration, any ‘original works of authorship’ is protected, including personal messages. 
Many will not be aware that their email messages are protected by copyright too, but their 
commercial value is very likely to be nil. Content industries, media industries and copyrights 
industries may, thus, for the purpose of this chapter, be used as synonyms. 
At present, one cannot understand the goings on in content industries without 
understanding the role copyrights play (Huygens et al. 2001; Klaes 1997). Firms producing 
and distributing works that are protected by copyrights typically rely on these rights; they 
allow them to weather downturns and they constitute de facto entry barriers. Examples of 
such ‘original works of authorship’, literary and artistic works in fixed form, include writings, 
music, drawings, dances, computer programs, and movies. In recent years databases have also 
come to be protected under copyright law (Mauer & Hugenholz 2001). Ideas, concepts, 
principles, algorithms, and ‘brute’ facts are not included. The first time copyrights were 
formally enacted was in the English Statute of Anne (1709) in the UK, based on informal 
previous practice. 
Copyright law protects the expression of an idea, rather than the idea itself; one merely 
has to able to prove anteriority. Copyrights can be considered to provide weaker protection 
than patents do as patents protect the idea whereas copyrights the particular expression of an 
idea. If the same idea is expressed in ways that are sufficiently different, both expressions will 
be protected from imitation without each infringing on the other. On the other hand, 
copyrights’ duration is longer, generally lasting for the life of the author plus 70 years. There 
is an overall increase in the duration copyrights provide protection. The Statute of Anne 
provided protection for 14 years (once renewable). Since 1993 in Europe and 1998 in the 
USA the term mentioned above holds. One does not have to apply in order for one’s creative 
work to be protected under copyright law, although having copyrighted work registered in 
some countries facilitates legal action against infringement. Copyrights actually refer to a 
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number of different though related rights to such works. Copyrights are exclusive right to use 
or authorize others to use the work on agreed terms. It includes reproduction in various forms, 
recordings of it, its broadcasting, its translation into other languages, or –more 
controversially- its adaptation, such as a novel into a screenplay. So-called ‘neighboring 
rights’ have been added in recent years, preventing the public performance of a work without 
consent from and payment of royalty to the author. Some limitations to copyrights have been 
discussed briefly above. 
2. Media, Copyrights and Technology 
Within the discipline of economics, a separate field of economics of information has emerged 
(Ripley 2001), recently acknowledged when Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz won the Nobel Prize 
in 2001. Information goods increasingly take on a central place in economic reality, whether it 
be pure information goods, or the information component of physical goods.  A number of 
goods that previously were inseparable from a physical object, now become or can be 
digitised.  One may think of books, video material, or audio material. Certainly the emerging 
‘market’ for digitised music has caught the attention over the past few years, shaking up as it 
did a sector in the economy that many people take a particular interest in, a sector that had 
also developed some degree of complacency. Internet and other technical means of 
communicating and exchanging information allow for an easier copying and distributing of 
information, in fact driving down marginal costs of such activities. This is in a way attractive 
for producers and distributors of information, but it also posses a threat. Others, particularly 
those who might otherwise have purchased the information, may now obtain the information 
from other sources, possibly at strongly reduced prices. This would in many cases be an 
infringement of the copyrights held in such works. Developments in technology have put 
pressure on the system of copyright law in previous decades as well by reducing the effort it 
takes to make copies (Burke 1996), but now the threat seems particularly acute (Schmidt et al. 
2003). 
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Table 2: A Glance at Content / Entertainment Markets  
 World USA  Japan UK The 
Netherlands 
Revenues music recordables  
        (US$, m, 2002) 
30,980.9 12,609 5,001 2,936    397.6 
Music copyrights, gross 
royalties (US$, m, 2002) 
6,626.78  1,940.42   759.64    669.73      176.57 
Production Long Films (#)  420ª 238 78‡ 16ª 
Cinema, attendance (m)  63‡ 123ª 114.6‡ 16ª 
Cinema, box office (US$, m)  5,250‡ 153,580ª 384‡ 188ª 
Daily Newspapers,  
        (# titles, 1996) 
 1520 122 99 38 
Books, # titles  (n.a.) 3,401† 2,853† 11,002º 
Books, trade balance, 
        (# copies, 1997) 
 689,001 -145,195 855,714 -24,900 
Radio receivers 
       (/1000 inhabitants, 1997)
 2116 956 1443 980 
Television sets 
       (/1000 inhabitants, 1997)
 806 686 521 519 
Leisure software (games, 
       US$, m, 2000) 
21.61 7.48 3.99 1.55  
Internet domains 31,987,198     
Information on the Internet 
      (terabytes)  
532,897     
Sources: IFPI (2003), NMPA (2002), UNESCO (1999), Spectrum Strategy Consultants 
(2002); P. Lyman and H.R. Varian, "How Much Information", 2003. Retrieved from             
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/how-much-info-2003 on [December 10, 2003]. Notes: º 1993; ª 
1994; † 1996; ‡ 1995. 
  
Information and communication technology (ICT) very rapidly and substantially changes our 
economy and society (Perez & Soete 1988). In times of changing techno-economical 
paradigms, it is not easy to make predictions. However, some comments can be made on the 
developments media will face in the future. Information goods have properties that make 
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them distinct from the goods exchanged on markets that generally figure in economic 
theories.  Consumption by one person does not exclude in any way the consumption by 
others.  In addition, and especially using ICTechnology, information goods may be consumed 
by several (many) individuals at the same time without either of them having an experience 
that is diminished in any way.  Information goods are, thus, non-excludable and non-rivalrous.  
Information, therefore, is a (quasi-) public good. 
Information products are not subject to damage through use or as a result of copying. 
A clandestine party, and even a customer, can benefit from the economic advantages of 
having manufactured such a product by unlawfully acquiring and marketing it. The options 
for unlawful uses are many; the result of such arbitrage is a decline of the product’s price. In 
addition, copies cannot be distinguished from the originals. For this reason, the price of the 
used, second-hand product does not alert the customer of the quality of the original. Second-
hand markets no longer give the quality-signals of the corresponding first hand products (cf. 
Akerlof 1970). A third feature of information products is that they can easily be modified. 
One could primarily think of modifications due to market developments or based on customer 
preference. Uncertainty for consumers increases, as the possibility to compare a product with 
others decreases. Providing demo versions does not completely solve this problem of 
information-asymmetry, inherent to information products, however. How should a customer 
judge the genuineness of the demo he or she is given if he is not able to determine how 
representative the demo is? Problems of information asymmetry are difficult to solve, unless 
by recourse to the reputation of the firm selling the product. Reputation is thus a valuable 
asset firms in markets for information goods.  Reputation can be hard to attain (Kuran ) – 
incumbent, well-endowed firms have an advantage in this regard. Attempts at manipulating 
intermediaries are tempting, and seem to be an inevitable part of the industry. For the music 
industry they are particularly well known and even studied by economist (Coase 1979).  
For these reasons larger firms producing content have an advantage. Their advantage 
is also due to the strong network effects in market where information goods are exchanged 
(Shapiro & Varian 1999). Consumption or use of information goods by some makes it more 
attractive for others to also start consuming the good. Each additional member of the group 
increases the value to the existing members of being a part of the group, for example by using 
the information good.  The product itself can be configured such that network effects are 
made better use of, for instance by playing into the social elements of consuming content.2   
                                                 
2 See Mitchell (1997), Frith (1996), Stahl (1997) and Dolfsma (2004b). 
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Another option is to make the products technically or thematically compatible with 
complementary goods. 
Discussed, or at least mentioned, much more extensively is another characteristic of 
information goods.  Information goods tend to have a distinct cost structure: creating a first 
issue involves high investment costs that are to a large degree sunk cost. Such costs need to be 
invested, but, to the extent that they are sunk, cannot be recovered if the project fails. They are 
idiosyncratic to the product or project. Budgets for producing a movie, a computer game, or a 
piece of music have multiplied over the past years. Marketing budgets have increased even 
more, as the supply of content has grown and diversified; being noticed is more difficult. 
Costs already ‘sunk’ in the project, must not but often are considered in a decision about 
whether or not to continue.  If, against the economic logic, a firm investing in the creation of 
an information good decides to continue anyway, it may come in a position, when the product 
can be brought to the market, where it decides to try to generate whatever cash flow it can to 
at least recover variable costs and some of the fixed costs.  The firm will thus cut prices, 
forcing other players in the field to adjust prices as well. 
High initial investment costs and low marginal or variable cost are an important 
consideration for firms in designing their strategy. A high investment, to be born before the 
product developed or produced can be marketed, implies that firms run a risk.  If the product 
does not find a (sufficiently large) market, such costs will not be recovered.  The sunk cost 
effect will be especially strong for markets where information products are exchanged.  
Alternatively, competitors can easily imitate an information product.  Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPRs) of various kinds, which legally protect the products of the intellect from being 
commercially exploited by or in the name of parties other than the creator/author, are only a 
partial protection from such imitation.  
Legal protection is, however, only one element of what might be called the 
‘appropriability regime’ of a product, determining the extent to which the innovative firm can 
appropriate the profits, or benefits more generally, associated with the product (Teece 1986).  
Another is the ‘nature of technology’, conceived broadly (see, e.g., Dolfsma 2001).  If, for 
instance, a (new) product must be produced using a new production process and is critically 
dependent on this process, the likelihood of imitation are diminished as process innovations 
need  to be ‘read’ from a product. New content are forms of products innovations. 
ICTechnology effects the production and distribution of content; as such it facilitates process 
innovation. In addition, the production of new content depends on tacit knowledge of people 
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involved, it is not so likely that the product can be imitated – one needs to be knowledgeable 
of previous content not only to be accepted by your peer producers of content, but also to be 
creative (Crane 1992, Shuker 1994).  Links with other parties, such as in (r)etail, the media, or 
organisations in the business of life performances are important complementary assets (Vogel 
1998), and often rely on personal contacts (Aksoy & Robins 1992; DeFillippi & Arthur 1998; Jones 
& DeFillippi 1996; Eberts & Norcliffe 1998).  In the interactions between musicians and the staff 
responsible for production, tacit knowledge plays an important role as well (Gillet 1996).  
While ICT would be facilitating some of the technical aspects of the work of producers, these 
are not the critical capabilities that they have.  Critical is the way they relate to the musicians.3 
Contrary to expectations (Malone et al. 1989), ICTechnology does not produce the perfect 
market from economists’ textbooks (cf. Brynjolfsson & Smith 2000; Graham 1998; Dolfsma 
1998). The ease of making versions of an information product gives competitors the 
opportunity to imitate cheaply but also gives the initial creator the possibility of catering to 
the different audiences and thereby increasing the revenues from an innovation – I will 
elaborate on this now. 
 
3. Price discrimination and Product Differentiation 
It is only recently that the Internet began to have an impact on society, an influence going 
beyond the confines of the universities and research laboratories where it had been in use for 
several decades.  Still, the theoretical discussion that has preceded this section, as well an 
understanding of the industry studied, does allow one to make some predictions.   
As a number of observers have indicated (a.o., Varian 1996, Reinartz 2001) the Internet 
provides ample opportunity to collect information about consumers’ preferences on the basis 
of which one might adjust the products one offers as a firm (‘versioning’), but on the basis of 
which one might also charge different prices to consumers with differing willingness to pay.  
Such price discrimination has different forms: 
 
 First-degree price discrimination means that the producer sells different units of output for 
different prices and these prices may differ from person to person. This is known as 
perfect price discrimination. 
 Second-degree price discrimination means that the producer sells different units of output 
for different prices, but every individual who buys the same amount of the good pays the 
                                                 
3 On the relation between innovation and trust or ‘culture’ more generally, see e.g. O’Reilly & Tushman (1997). 
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same price. Thus prices depend on the amount of the good purchased, but not on who does 
the purchasing. A common example of this sort of pricing is volume discounts.  
 Third-degree price discrimination occurs when the producer sells output to different 
people for different prices, but every unit of output sold to a given person sells for the 
same price. This is the most common form of price discrimination, and examples include 
senior citizens' discounts, student discounts, and so on.  
 
Conditions for price discrimination to hold include the availability of information to 
discriminate between (groups of) consumers, and the absence of arbitrage between the groups 
or individuals addressed.  The Internet would now seem to offer the possibility of first-degree 
price discrimination.  People’s willingness to pay is easy to determine, while the (menu) costs 
for re-pricing goods on the Internet decrease. There is, of course, the possibility that people 
will be upset when they learn that identical products are sold on different terms.  As 
consumers become more sophisticated about buying on-line, this objection might disappear 
(Reinartz 2001). 
 Important in evaluating price discrimination in welfare economic terms is Figure 6.  
The total area below the demand curve signifies the utility to society when such a product 
would be available free of charge.  Assume a given price (P0).  Area R is the revenue accruing 
to the firms in this market.  Areas A and B are, however, of greatest import in a welfare 
analysis.  A is the so-called consumers’ surplus; it is the price which some consumers would 
have been willing to pay for a product, but, given the price prevailing in the market, did not 
have to pay.  They can now spend it on something else.  Area B is a dead-weight welfare 
(efficiency) loss, since the consumers here would like to have consumed the good, but the 
good is not offered at the price they are able or willing to pay. 
 
Figure 1: Price discrimination 
 
Price     Supply 
      
 A 
P0 
      R 
    B Demand 
      q0  Quantity 
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 Price discrimination means that some consumers pay a higher price, but not all.  More 
consumers may be able to consume the good. Price discrimination will most likely on the 
Internet be combined with product differentiation, making it hard to asses the consequences; 
consumers may have to be paying a higher price, but will also obtain a product that more 
closely meets their preferences. It is likely that the first effect will be stronger than the latter. 
Since they need to make idiosyncratic investments, they are more dependent on this 
relationship than the firms are (cf. Williamson 1985).  It is only after an initial period where 
consumers invest in a relationship by filling in questionnaires, surfing on a site, and 
answering questions that they may expect the benefits of tailored products.  As such, they may 
become the victims of opportunistic behaviour from the part of the firm; they are locked-in to 
a relation. 
 For pure information goods, marginal costs for producing an additional copy are or 
approach zero.  Economic analysis would suggest that people should be able to obtain such a 
good at a price that equals marginal costs, a situation where public welfare would be greatest.  
The dead-weight loss of triangle B would not occur. At the same time, however, there would 
be no material incentive for people to create new information goods. IPR are an important 
element in such an incentive system. It involves introducing a measure of excludability where 
nothing like that exists naturally. A static consequence would be that the quantity of goods 
brought to the market will be more limited – a disadvantage. Dynamic consequences due to 
the incentive provided for creativity might, however, outweigh this. Do copyrights contribute 
to an incentive system that makes creative individuals produce more new ideas and products?  
The picture is unclear.  Most of the benefits due to the existence of copyrights, at least for the 
music industry, accrue to intermediaries such as music publishers and record companies 
(Towse 1999; Dolfsma 2000).  Particularly younger creative individuals are paid little, 
although they are most creative.4  Whether this points to an inherent need to be creative and 
express oneself, or on an (irrational) expectation that one will become one of the few stars in 
the system cannot be determined more conclusively (Abbing 2002). 
On electronic markets consumers continuously provide information about their 
preferences and their willingness-to-pay. Firms can and do make use of that information 
directly in altering the (bundle of) product(s) they offer, and the price they offer it for. Rather 
                                                 
4 On this particular point, as well as on the issue of motivation of individuals and the role of material incentives 
generally, see Frey (1997). 
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than the trial-and-error process of taking a new product to the market and waiting to see if 
there will be demand for it, firms now know (much) more about their customers who in fact 
become subcontractors, becoming relatively more dependent on suppliers of digital content 
than the other way around, even thought the volatility of markets for content does limit the 
influence of providers. 
 
4. Content that binds 
In emerging electronic markets consumers are flooded with information that they need to 
filter and qualify. Intermediaries are in a much better position to perform these tasks than 
consumers themselves. Not only will they be able to exploit economies of scale and scope in 
gathering and interpreting information about products available on the Internet, but they will 
be able to strike deals with upstream suppliers to consider their products and bring them to the 
attention of consumers. Intermediaries' position will depend on their reputation in both the 
market where they buy products (information, usually) from suppliers, and where they sell to 
final consumers. Consumers in their turn, will appreciate the selection of information done for 
them by these intermediaries and will be willing to pay for these services. 
With the use of the preferences that consumers reveal by their implicitly or explicitly 
stated choices, the intermediaries that form the last chain before the consumers are able to 
construct detailed consumer profiles. Answers to questions, information about previous 
purchases, as well as clicking behaviour, constitutes valuable information that intermediaries 
use to customize their products as well as their sales efforts. Since contemporary hardware 
and software become increasingly sophisticated, information gathering and subsequent 
profiling on the basis of that can be automated to a significant degree.  Consumer profiles that 
intermediaries are able to construct become increasingly focused on single individuals. 
Indeed, firms’ overall strategies are increasingly informed by such considerations.5 As 
consumers are, as such, increasingly involved in the production process itself - especially in 
the design and marketing aspects of it (if one can still legitimately distinguish between these 
aspects in cases such as these) - one may for that reason perceive of them as subcontractors to 
the intermediaries or suppliers (Dolfsma 2004). 
Consumers and intermediaries may both benefit from these developments in electronic 
markets. Consumers benefit because they can save time searching for the products they want 
                                                 
5  A good, and some would say notorious, example is Microsoft (see Financial Times, December 31, 2001 
“Microsoft’s direct connection to the customer”). 
 
11
and will even be offered items they might like but had not considered or known about until 
then, of a kind and quality that meets their preferences to higher degrees.  Intermediaries will 
particularly benefit, however (Dolfsma, 1998). They are crucial gatekeepers as they control an 
important funnel of attention that consumers rely on to determine the quality and value of 
information goods (cf. Crane, 1992). It will be difficult for upstream suppliers to go around 
this bottleneck and reach consumers directly or establish their own intermediary.  
Intermediaries that have established a reputation have an advantage over new entrants in that 
they have already established links with (potential) consumers.  
Given that digital products can easily be reproduced and versioned, and do not 
deteriorate if used or copied (Whinston et al., 1997), customisation of them is progressing and 
will continue to do so in the future. Consumers, however, need to convey information about 
themselves in order to secure these benefits of customisation. However this information is 
conveyed, it means much more investment in terms of time and money on the part of 
consumers than on the part of intermediaries. Intermediaries will do much of the information 
gathering and classifying by the use of special software. The extensive databases that are thus 
built can subsequently be used to fine-tune marketing efforts and offer customers products 
that will meet their preferences in better ways. Related products in which some interest may 
have been expressed can also be presented. Firms such as Amazon generate additional 
revenues efficiently and add to the profiles that they already have of other, similar people. 
Since the cost of investing in a market relation between intermediary and consumer is 
much higher for the latter than for the former, and switching costs for a consumer are high, 
the investments of consumers can be considered as idiosyncratic investments in terms of 
transaction costs economics (Williamson 1975). These investments are idiosyncratic, because 
discontinuing the business relation in which investments were made and starting one with 
another intermediary means that the consumer has to enter into a process of providing implicit 
or explicit information about his preferences to this new partner afresh. Such investments 
make the party undertaking them dependent on the other party in the relation; he is locked 
into a relation. This second party may then use the leverage to extract higher rents from the 
relation. 
Before making the investment, consumers may therefore need to be persuaded of the 
benefits they will reap from entering into such a relationship with an intermediary. Once this 
relationship has started, the investment involved in the investments made will prevent either 
party to abandon it. If one party has invested idiosyncratically, this party will be in an 
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unfavourable position. Rational consumers may be aware of this and decline to enter into such 
a relation. If no alternative firms are available that will not build and use profiles to their own 
advantage, even rational and knowledgeable customers may have to enter into such a relation. 
What is more, statements of firms on electronic markets to the effect that they will not use 
people’s information have been violated before.6 Olson’s (1965) logic of collective action 
indicates that organizing many consumers to prevent firms from adopting the kind of policy 
discussed above will be insurmountably difficult. Customers are likely, in addition, to have to 
do without the benefits associated with such practices as well, however. When consumers are 
not rational and perfectly informed homo economici, but rather creatures of habit (e.g. 
Dolfsma 2002, 2004b), there is an additional reason why they will simply enter into a relation 
with an established, reputed firm and later find themselves in a subcontracting relation. 
Consumers generally are aware of their investment, and if they are not yet aware they 
will rapidly become aware of it; their knowledge does not stop them, however, from 
participating in such a relationship.  The potential benefits of decreased search costs and 
increased fulfilment of their needs may convince them that it is beneficial to initiate a 
relationship with a particular intermediary. Consumers may also appreciate it when they are 
pointed to different but related products. In addition, intermediaries in this early and immature 
state of many electronic markets have started to compensate (potential) customers for the 
personal and unique information they provide by answering questionnaires. This 
compensation takes the form of rebates or samples. 
The balance of advantages and disadvantages for consumers and firms might be 
different for electronic markets. Why would intermediary firms necessarily be the parties that 
are likely to gain most?  Even if they are to gain more than consumers, however, that gain 
may not be at the expense of Internet consumers. Total economic activity may expand due to 
developments in Internet markets. The additional consumer surplus may outweigh the 
deadweight loss that consumers suffer; in all the process may end up in a situation that is a 
Pareto improvement even when further welfare improvements would be possible. If it is, and 
if intermediaries take the bigger share of that market, the economic position of consumers 
need not deteriorate in absolute terms. Developments in electronic markets can increase the 
economic pie, even when they can change the distribution of the pie itself. 
                                                 
6 Despite the public outcry that this has sometimes evoked, such action may not be illegal. Firms on electronic 
markets can have their customers sign ‘click-wrap’ contracts that many never read that contain clauses that allow 
them to alter their policy in relation to privacy without consent of their extant customers. 
 
13
Furthermore, two countervailing forces are at play in electronic Internet markets that 
set limits to the degree to which intermediaries can wield their market power. One is the fact 
that communities that form in the virtual world - for instance, in discussion groups – may find 
it more easy to organize themselves as they are not bound by geography and can more easily 
reach a critical mass. The likelihood that information about alternative intermediaries to turn 
to or about (alleged) abuses by the intermediary with whom community members now deal 
will disperse in the network or community is substantial. The background and sources of 
information at the disposal of each member of the community when he  will likely differ 
significantly more than in traditional, physical markets.  In network theory, this is known as 
the ‘weak ties’ argument, and for many different situations it has positive effects (see, e.g., 
Granovetter 1995).  Especially Rheingold (1994) believes that Internet communities will be 
an important countervailing power in the social and the economic realm.  Jones (1995, 1998) 
provides empirical studies of Internet communities that present a more mixed perspective. 
Extant relations tend to persist, or tend to be reflected in relations on the Internet; power is not 
absent from the Internet, contrary to what many had expected. Whatever effect Internet 
communities have on the behaviour of firms depends on firms wanting to preserve their 
reputation. 
A second tendency that will be observed as electronic markets develop and mature is 
an increased volatility in demand on these markets.  New products altogether, or new variants 
of an existing products are likely to find their way to the market.  These will partly be 
delivered by entrants on electronic markets in an attempt to establish a foothold in a particular 
market, but may also be launched by incumbents as a means of constructing barriers to entry 
and defend their own position on a market.  Such practices by incumbents are already known 
for certain physical markets such as cereals, soaps, washing powders, and detergents (cf. 
Scherer and Ross, 1990) and will be copied and perfected on Internet markets. 
Whether or not incumbents will succeed in maintaining their possibly dominant 
positions in electronic markets depends on how responses to their behaviour is perceived and 
acted upon in the different Internet communities that are relevant to these firms.  Internet 
communities have extended possibilities to express, in terms described by Hirschmann 
(1970), their voice, while their members may not always be able to exercise the exit option 
because they are locked into a relation with an intermediary that they themselves have 
invested in heavily.  How this works out in terms of the absolute and relative numbers of 
customers who remain loyal to an intermediary firm and the products it brings to a market is 
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not clear.  The effect may be that the position of a firm will become less secure than it is in 
physical markets, but that need not necessarily result in its position inevitably deteriorating.  
Entertainment industries provide examples of industries where a fundamental feature of 
business is an equivalently high degree of demand volatility.  Still these industries tend to be 
dominated by a few large companies (see Vogel, 1998), because large, diversified firms can 
take advantage of such circumstances while small, single-product firms are very vulnerable. 
Relevant Internet communities consist of large numbers of consumers with diverse interests.  
As Olson has argued persuasively already in 1965, a small group of parties that has a well-
defined interest often finds it easy to mobilize against such a large(r) group.  In addition, as 
Internet communities allow for people to communicate anonymously, parties (firms) that have 
a specific interest may be able to introduce information in the community through individuals 
that pose themselves as independent. Sony Music has notoriously done so by persuading a 
reviewer of newly released music to write favourably on its music. Future developments will 
thus, of course, have to decide which of these tendencies will be stronger. 
 
5. Organizing Product Innovations 
The ongoing existence of companies in the media industry is closely related to their capability 
not only of constantly developing new products, but also of targeting a large enough market 
with these products. The rate of success of new products in the media industry already used to 
be at a relatively low level of 10% in the 1960s and 1970s (Peterson & Berger 1975), but it 
has even declined in the years thereafter. 95% of music released nowadays does not even 
reach its break-even point. While, of course, the thorough selection before actual release of 
songs involves substantial costs as well. However, the few media products that actually are 
profitable handsomely compensate for the non-profitable others. The success of product 
innovations thus challenges the organisation of media companies. Scale is important to 
survive failures, but a certain feeling of the market is equally important. The latter is 
notoriously difficult for large corporations. 
Given the pressure of illegal use on information product markets, producers are driven 
to constantly launch new products. It is a certain way to stay ahead of – unlawful – 
competition. In addition, adapting products to every taste is a well-known strategy that has 
been initially analysed by the economist Hotelling (1929) in the case of ice cream parlours 
alongside beaches. Possibilities to influence success of a certain song through effective 
marketing are there, but of limited use as consumers are not perfectly malleable nitwits. 
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The large incumbent players in the music industry – the "majors" – control the most 
important complementary assets that allow them to maintain and even improve their position 
over long periods of time despite the uncertainty in the market. For decades the 5 majors have 
a combined market share of 80% (Table 3) – the music industry is no exception among the 
entertainment industries. Deep (financial) pockets, distribution capabilities and marketing 
expertise are what large, existing corporations focus on – based on these capabilities, they are 
in the more advantageous position. 
 
Table 3: The Five Major Record Companies (% of sales, 2000),  
 Global 
Universal 21.1 
Sony 17.4 
EMI 14.1 
Warner – Time Warner 13.4 
BMG - Bertelsmann 11.4 
Independents 22.6 
Sources: Music Business International (MBI, 2000). 
 
Next to this negative reason to increase the pace of product innovation, there are several 
positive reasons. It is important for businesses in the media industry to launch new products in 
order to be ahead of competition and to make the most out of a certain market. Product life 
cycles have shortened, the fashion extent of the economy increases. Producing upgrades or 
versions of existing goods limits the costs of product innovation. Initial costs have already 
been made. 
If businesses learn that a smaller percentage of new products prove successful, they 
must be able to survive unsuccessful releases. The period for raising profits from the market 
will shorten. Success has to be generated through short, highly agile, intensive and 
sophisticated advertisement, but there are additional means to use. A proven strategy is that of 
building on previous success by creating "platforms". Platforms can remain internal to the 
genre. The star system in the music industry is an example of such a platform strategy. Star 
musicians releasing a new album have less chance on the new production becoming a flop. 
Platforms can also transcend genres: Britney Spears who "writes" a book, or the Spice Girls 
who shoote a film are examples. Music proves to be a media product that can serve as 
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platform itself, but it can rely on other platforms as well. Stars featuring in a film increase the 
chance for success of that production. The soundtrack of a Disney film, made by Elton John, 
is an example of this. One should not be surprised that the influence of companies in the 
media industry is widespread. The result is that for entertainment industries economies of 
scope are important. Being present in related fields allows you to leverage a successful 
product in related fields or genres as Table indicates.  
 
Table 4: Economies of Scope in Entertainment Industries 
 Time Warner Disney Sony Seagram Bertels
-mann 
Viacom Newscorp 
Television, 
production 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Film √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Music √ √ √ √ √  √ 
Publishing √ √   √ √ √ 
Television, 
Broadcasting 
√ √   √ √ √ 
Cable television √ √ √ √  √ √ 
Satellite television √  √ √ √  √ 
Internet √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Theme parks √ √    √  
Retail √  √    √ √  
Source: The Economist (1998) “Wheel of Fortune – A survey of technology and 
Entertainment”. 21 November. 
 
The importance of a thorough feeling for the market will increase, implying the need for a 
very flexible way of organizing a big firm (Storper 1989; Hakfoort & Weigand 2000). Major 
players in the entertainment industries thus seek agreements with smaller ones in order to take 
over talent that proved successful in local markets. Both players benefit from such an 
arrangement (Hesmondhalgh 1998). The kind of agreements that result are complex, offering 
a range of incentives to the players involved (Caves 2000). 
 
6. Some Conclusions 
 
17
Content industries are in a genuine maelstrom at the moment. Many developments affect 
them, many of those related to what might be called infomatization. Content increasingly is 
digital. Some developments stand out, however, and these offer opportunities to content 
producing firms and not just threats, but affect consumers too. Compiling extensive consumer 
profiles offers the possibility for unforeseen product differentiation and price discrimination. 
These derive from the fundamentally different characteristics of digital content (information) 
as compared to physical products. Consumers may even be perceived as becoming 
subcontractors to firms producing content. Still, past underpinnings of content industries 
(most notably copyrights) are potentially altered substantially, and so may affect the dynamics 
in the markets and industry structures.  
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